Israel |
United States |
Israel–United States relations are an important factor in the United States government's overall policy in the Middle East, and Congress has placed considerable importance on the maintenance of a close and supportive relationship. The main expression of Congressional support for Israel has been foreign aid.[1] Since 1985, it has provided nearly $3 billion in grants annually to Israel, with Israel being the largest annual recipient of American aid from 1976 to 2004 and the largest cumulative recipient of aid since World War II.[2] Congress has monitored the aid issue closely along with other issues in bilateral relations, and its concerns have affected Administration's policies.[1] Almost all U.S. aid to Israel is now in the form of military assistance, while in the past it also received significant economic assistance. Strong congressional support for Israel has resulted in Israel’s receiving benefits not available to other countries.[2]
Bilateral relations have evolved from an initial U.S. policy of sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in 1948 to an unusual partnership that links a small but militarily powerful Israel, dependent on the United States for its economic and military strength, with the American superpower trying to balance other competing interests in the region. Some in the United States question the levels of aid and general commitment to Israel, and argue that a U.S. bias toward Israel operates at the expense of improved U.S. relations with various Arab and Muslim governments. Others maintain that Israel is a strategic ally, and that US relations with Israel strengthen the US presence in the Middle East.[1] Israel is one of the United States' two original major non-NATO allies in the Middle East. Currently, there are seven major non-NATO allies in the Greater Middle East.
Support for Zionism among American Jews was minimal however, until the involvement of Louis Brandeis in the Federation of American Zionists,[3] starting in 1912 and the establishment of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs in 1914; it was empowered by the Zionist Organization ‘to deal with all Zionist matters, until better times come.”[4]
While Woodrow Wilson was sympathetic to the plight of Jews in Europe, he repeatedly stated in 1919 that U.S. policy was to "acquiesce" to the Balfour Declaration but not officially support Zionism.[5] The US Congress however passed the Lodge-Fish resolution,[6] the first joint resolution stating its support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" on September 21, 1922.[7][8] The same day, the Mandate of Palestine was approved by the Council of the League of Nations. Despite two similar attempts by Congress during the war, the policy of acquiescence continued until after World War II.
During the war, US foreign policy decisions were often ad hoc moves and solutions dictated by the demands of the war. At the Biltmore Conference in May 1942, the Zionist movement made a fundamental departure from traditional Zionist policy and its stated goals,[9] with its demand "that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth."[10]
Following the war, the “new postwar era witnessed an intensive involvement of the United States in the political and economic affairs of the Middle East, in contrast to the hands-off attitude characteristic of the prewar period. Under Truman the United States had to face and define its policy in all three sectors that provided the root causes of American interests in the region: the Soviet threat, the birth of Israel, and petroleum.”[11]
Previous American presidents, although encouraged by active support from members of the American and world Jewish communities, as well as domestic civic groups, labor unions, political parties, supported the Jewish homeland concept, alluded to in Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration, they officially continued to "acquiesce". Throughout the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, the Departments of War and State recognized the possibility of a Soviet-Arab connection and the potential Arab restriction on Oil supplies to the US, and advised against U.S. intervention on behalf of the Jews.[12] With continuing conflict in the area and worsening humanitarian conditions among Holocaust survivors in Europe, on November 29, 1947 and with US support, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181, the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, which was to create Jewish and Arab states and take effect upon British withdrawal. The decision was heavily lobbied by Zionist supporters, which Truman himself later noted,[13] and rejected by the Arabs.
As the end of the mandate approached, the decision to recognize the Jewish state remained contentious, with significant disagreement between President Truman, his domestic and campaign adviser, Clark Clifford, and both the State Department and Defense Department. Truman, while sympathetic to the Zionist cause, was most concerned about relieving the plight of the displaced persons; Secretary of State George Marshall feared U.S. backing of a Jewish state would harm relations with the Muslim world, limit access to Middle Eastern oil, and destabilize the region. On May 12, 1948, Truman met in the Oval Office with Secretary of State Marshall, Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, Counsel to the President Clark Clifford and several others to discuss the Palestine situation. Clifford argued in favor of recognizing the new Jewish state in accordance with the partition resolution. Marshall opposed Clifford's arguments, contending they were based on domestic political considerations in the election year. Marshall said that if Truman followed Clifford's advice and recognized the Jewish state, then he would vote against Truman in the election. Truman did not clearly state his views in the meeting.[14] Two days later, on May 14, 1948, the United States, under Truman, became the first country to extend de facto recognition to the state of Israel, 11 minutes after it unilaterally declared itself independent. With this unexpected decision, US representative to the United Nations Warren Austin, whose team had been working on an alternative trusteeship proposal, shortly thereafter left his office at the UN and went home. Secretary of State Marshall sent a State Department official to the United Nations to prevent the entire United States delegation from resigning.[14] De jure recognition came on January 31, 1949.
Following UN mediation by American Ralph Bunche, the 1949 Armistice Agreements ended the 1948 Arab Israeli War. Related to enforcement of the armistice, the United States signed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 with Britain and France. In it, they pledged to take action within and outside the United Nations to prevent violations of the frontiers or armistice lines, and outlined their commitment to peace and stability in the area, their opposition to the use or threat of force, and reiterated their opposition to the development of an arms race in the region.
Under rapidly changing geopolitical circumstances, U.S. policy in the Middle East generally, was geared toward supporting Arab states independence, the development of oil-producing countries, preventing Soviet influence from gaining a foothold in Greece, Turkey and Iran, as well as preventing an arms race and maintaining a neutral stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. U.S. policymakers initially used foreign aid to support these objectives.
During these years of austerity, the United States provided Israel moderate amounts of economic aid, mostly as loans for basic food stuffs; a far greater share of state income derived from German war reparations, which were used for domestic development.
France became Israel's main arms supplier at this time and provided Israel with advanced military equipment and technology. This support was seen by Israel to counter the perceived threat from Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser with respect to the "Czech arms deal" of September 1955. During the 1956 Suez Crisis for differing reasons, France, Israel and Britain colluded to topple Nasser by regaining control of the Suez Canal, following its nationalization, and to occupy parts of western Sinai assuring free passage of shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.[15] In response, the U.S., with support from Soviet Union at the United Nations intervened on behalf of Egypt to force a withdrawal. Afterward, Nasser expressed a desire to establish closer relations with the United States. Eager to increase its influence in the region, and prevent Nasser from going over to the Soviet Bloc, U.S. policy was to remain neutral and not become too closely allied with Israel. In the early 1960s, the U.S. would begin to sell advanced, but defensive, weapons to Israel, Egypt and Jordan, including Hawk anti aircraft missiles.
During Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency, U.S. policy shifted to a whole-hearted, but not unquestioning, support for Israel. Prior to the Six-Day War of 1967, U.S. administrations had taken considerable care to avoid giving the appearance of favoritism. Writing in American Presidents and the Middle East, George Lenczowski notes, "Johnson's was an unhappy, virtually tragic presidency", regarding "America's standing and posture in the Middle East", and marked a turning point in both U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Arab relations.[16] He characterizes the Middle Eastern perception of the US as moving from "the most popular of Western countries" before 1948, to having "its glamour diminished, but Eisenhower's standing during the Arab-Israeli Suez Crisis convinced many Middle Eastern moderates that, if not actually lovable, the United States was at least a fair country to deal with; this view of U.S. fairness and impartiality still prevailed during Kennedy's presidency; but during Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency America's policy took a definite turn in the pro-Israeli direction. The June war of 1967 confirmed this impression, and from 1967 on [writing in 1990] the United States emerged as the most distrusted if not actually hated country in the Middle East."
Leading up to the war, while the Administration was sympathetic to Israel's need to defend itself against foreign attack, the U.S. worried that Israel's response would be disproportionate and potentially destabilizing. Israel's raid into Jordan after the Samu Incident was very troubling to the U.S. because Jordan was also an ally and had received over $500 million in aid for construction of the East Ghor Main Canal, which was virtually destroyed in subsequent raids.
The primary concern of the Johnson Administration was that should war break out in the region, the United States and Soviet Union would be drawn into it. Intense diplomatic negotiations with the nations in the region and the Soviets, including the first use of the Hotline, failed to prevent war. When Israel launched preemptive strikes against the Egyptian Air force, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was disappointed as he felt a diplomatic solution could have been possible.
In 1966, when defecting Iraqi pilot Munir Redfa landed in Israel flying a Soviet-built MiG-21 fighter jet, information on the plane was immediately shared with the United States.
During the Six-Day War, Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]], a US Navy intelligence ship in Egyptian waters, killing 34 and wounding 171. Israel claimed the Liberty was mistaken as the Egyptian vessel El Quseir, and it was an instance of friendly fire. The U.S. government accepted it as such, although the incident raised much controversy, and is still believed by some to have been deliberate. Following the war, the perception in Washington was that many Arab states (notably Egypt) had permanently drifted toward the Soviets. In 1968, with strong support from Congress, Johnson approved the sale of Phantom fighters to Israel, establishing the precedent for U.S. support for Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbors. The U.S., however, continued to provide military equipment to Arab states such as Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, to counter Soviet arms sales in the region.
During the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, Israeli commandos captured a Soviet-built P-12 radar station in an operation code-named Rooster 53. Previously-unknown information was subsequently shared with the U.S.
When the French government imposed an arms embargo on Israel in 1967, Israeli spies procured designs of the Dassault Mirage 5 from a Swiss-Jewish engineer in order to build the IAI Kfir. These designs were also shared with the United States.
On June 19, 1970, Secretary of State William P. Rogers formally proposed the Rogers Plan, which called for a 90 day cease-fire and a military standstill zone on each side of the Suez Canal, to calm the ongoing War of Attrition. It was an effort to reach agreement specifically on the framework of UN Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and mutual recognition of each state's sovereignty and independence.[17] The Egyptians accepted the Rogers Plan, but the Israelis were split and did not; they failed to get sufficient support within the 'unity government'. Despite the Labor-dominant Alignment's, formal acceptance of UN 242 and "peace for withdrawal" earlier that year, Menachem Begin and the right wing Gahal alliance were adamantly opposed to withdraw from the Palestinian Territories; the second-largest party in the government resigned on August 5, 1970.[18] Ultimately the plan also failed due to insufficient support from Nixon for his Secretary of State's plan, preferring instead the position of his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, not to pursue the initiative.
No breakthrough occurred even after President Sadat of Egypt in 1972 unexpectedly expelled Soviet advisers from Egypt, and again signaled to Washington his willingness to negotiate.[19] Faced with this lack of progress on the diplomatic front, and hoping to force the Nixon administration to become more involved, Egypt prepared for military conflict. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria, with additional Arab support, attacked Israeli forces occupying their territory since the 1967 war, thus starting the Yom Kippur War.
Despite intelligence indicating an attack from Egypt and Syria, Prime Minister Golda Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike. Meir, among other concerns, feared alienating the United States, if Israel was seen as starting another war, as Israel only trusted the United States to come to its aid. In retrospect, the decision not to strike was probably a sound one. Later, according to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had Israel struck first, they would not have received "so much as a nail." On October 6, 1973, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria, with the support of Arab expeditionary forces and with backing from the Soviet Union, launched simultaneous attacks against Israel. The resulting conflict is known as the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian Army was initially able to breach Israeli defenses advance into the Sinai and establish defensive positions along the east bank of the Suez Canal, but were later repulsed in a massive tank battle when they tried to advance further to draw pressure away from Syria. The Israelis then crossed Suez Canal. Major battles with heavy losses for both sides took place. At the same time, the Syrians almost broke through Israel's thin defenses in the Golan Heights, but were eventually stopped by reinforcements and pushed back, followed by a successful Israeli advance into Syria. Israel also gained the upper hand in the air and at sea early in the war. Days into the war, it has been suggested that Meir authorized the assembly of Israeli nuclear bombs. This was done openly, perhaps in order to draw American attention, but Meir authorized their use against Egyptian and Syrian targets only if Arab forces managed to advance too far.[20][21] The Soviets began to resupply Arab forces, predominantly Syria. Golda Meir asked President Nixon for help with military supply. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told Nixon “Let Israel bleed”. The New York Times reported three years afterwards that Kissinger delayed the airlift because he wanted to see Israel “bleed just enough to soften it up for the post-war diplomacy he was planning.” However, President Nixon ordered the full scale commencement of a strategic airlift operation to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel; this last move is sometimes called "the airlift that saved Israel." However, by the time the supplies arrived, Israel was gaining the upper hand.
Again, the U.S. and Soviets feared that they would be drawn into a Middle East conflict. After the Soviets threatened intervention on the behalf of Egypt, following Israeli advances beyond the cease-fire lines, the U.S. increased the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three, the highest peacetime level. This was prompted after Israel trapped Egypt's Third Army east of the Suez canal.
Kissinger realized the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity—Egypt was totally dependent on the U.S. to prevent Israel from destroying the army, which now had no access to food or water. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to mediate the dispute, and push Egypt out of Soviet influences. As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist." The Egyptians later withdrew their request for support and the Soviets complied.
After the war, Kissinger pressured the Israelis to withdraw from Arab lands; this contributed to the first phases of a lasting Israeli-Egyptian peace. American support of Israel during the war contributed to the 1973 OPEC embargo against the United States, which was lifted in March 1974.
The Jimmy Carter years were characterized by very active U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process. With the May 1977 election of Likud's Menachem Begin as prime minister, after 30 years of leading the Israeli government opposition, major changes took place regarding Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.[1] This, in turn led to friction in U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations. The two frameworks included in the Carter-initiated Camp David process were viewed by right wing elements in Israel as creating U.S. pressures on Israel to withdraw from the captured Palestinian territories, as well as forcing it to take risks for the sake of peace with Egypt. Likud governments have since argued that their acceptance of full withdrawal from the Sinai as part of these accords and the eventual Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty fulfilled the Israeli pledge to withdraw from occupied territory.[1] President Carter's support for a Palestinian homeland and for Palestinian political rights particularly created tensions with the Likud government, and little progress was achieved on that front.
Israeli supporters expressed concerns early in the first Ronald Reagan term about potential difficulties in U.S.-Israeli relations, in part because several Presidential appointees had ties or past business associations with key Arab countries (Secretaries Caspar Weinberger and George P. Shultz, for example, were officers in the Bechtel Corporation, which has strong links to the Arab world, see Arab lobby in the United States.) But President Reagan's personal support for Israel and the compatibility between Israeli and Reagan perspectives on terrorism, security cooperation, and the Soviet threat, led to considerable strengthening in bilateral relations.
In 1981, Weinberger and Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon signed Strategic Cooperation Agreement, establishing a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance the national security of both countries. In November 1983, the two sides formed a Joint Political Military Group, which meets twice a year, to implement most provisions of that agreement. Joint air and sea military exercises began in June 1984, and the United States constructed two War Reserve Stock facilities in Israel to stockpile military equipment. Although intended for American forces in the Middle East, the equipment can be transferred to Israeli use if necessary.
U.S.-Israeli ties strengthened during the second Reagan term. Israel was granted "major non-NATO ally" status in 1989 that gave it access to expanded weapons systems and opportunities to bid on U.S. defense contracts. The United States maintained grant aid to Israel at $3 billion annually and implemented a free trade agreement in 1985. Since then all customs duties between the two trading partners have been eliminated. However, relations soured when Israel carried out Operation Opera, an Israeli airstrike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Reagan suspended a shipment of military aircraft to Israel, and harshly criticized the action. Relations also soured during the 1982 Lebanon War, when the United States even contemplated sanctions to stop the Israeli Siege of Beirut. The U.S. reminded Israel that weaponry provided by the U.S. was to be used for defensive purposes only, and suspended shipments of cluster munitions to Israel. Although the war exposed some serious differences between Israeli and U.S. policies, such as Israel's rejection of the Reagan peace plan of September 1, 1982, it did not alter the Administration's favoritism for Israel and the emphasis it placed on Israel's importance to the United States. Although critical of Israeli actions, the United States vetoed a Soviet-proposed United Nations Security Council resolution to impose an arms embargo on Israel.
In 1985, the U.S. supported Israel's economic stabilization through roughly $1.5 billion in two-year loan guarantees the creation of a U.S.-Israel bilateral economic forum called the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG).
The second Reagan term ended on what many Israelis considered to be a sour note when the United States opened a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in December 1988. But, despite the US-PLO dialogue, the Pollard spy case, or the Israeli rejection of the Shultz peace initiative in the spring of 1988, pro-Israeli organizations in the United States characterized the Reagan Administration (and the 100th Congress) as the "most pro-Israel ever" and praised the positive overall tone of bilateral relations.
Secretary of State James Baker told an American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC, a pro-Israel lobby group) audience on May 22, 1989, that Israel should abandon its "expansionist policies," a remark many took as a signal that the relatively pro-Israel Reagan years were over. President Bush raised the ire of the Likud government when he told a press conference on March 3, 1991, that East Jerusalem was occupied territory and not a sovereign part of Israel as Israel claims. Israel had annexed East Jerusalem in 1980, an action which did not gain international recognition. The United States and Israel disagreed over the Israeli interpretation of the Israeli plan to hold elections for a Palestinian peace conference delegation in the summer of 1989, and also disagreed over the need for an investigation of the Jerusalem incident of October 8, 1990, in which Israeli police killed 17 Palestinians.
Amid the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and Iraqi threats against Israel generated by it, former President Bush repeated the U.S. commitment to Israel's security. Israeli-U.S. tension eased after the start of the Persian Gulf war on January 16, 1991, when Israel became a target of Iraqi Scud missiles. The United States urged Israel not to retaliate against Iraq for the attacks because it was believed that Iraq wanted to draw Israel into the conflict and force other coalition members, Egypt and Syria in particular, to quit the coalition and join Iraq in a war against Israel. Israel did not retaliate, and gained praise for its restraint.
Following the Gulf War, the administration immediately returned to Arab-Israeli peacemaking, believing there was a window of opportunity to use the political capital generated by the U.S. victory to revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process. On March 6, 1991, President Bush addressed Congress in a speech often cited as the administration’s principal policy statement on the new order in relation to the Middle East, following the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.[22][23] Michael Oren summarizes the speech, saying: “The president proceeded to outline his plan for maintaining a permanent U.S. naval presence in the Gulf, for providing funds for Middle East development, and for instituting safeguards against the spread of unconventional weapons. The centerpiece of his program, however, was the achievement of an Arab-Israeli treaty based on the territory-for-peace principle and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights.” As a first step Bush announced his intention to reconvene the international peace conference in Madrid.[22]
Unlike earlier American peace efforts however, no new aid commitments would be used. This was both because President Bush and Secretary Baker felt the coalition victory and increased U.S. prestige would itself induce a new Arab-Israeli dialogue, and because their diplomatic initiative focused on process and procedure rather than on agreements and concessions. From Washington's perspective, economic inducements would not be necessary, but these did enter the process because Israel injected them in May. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's request for $10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees added a new dimension to U.S. diplomacy and sparked a political showdown between his government and the Bush administration.[24]
Bush and Baker were thus instrumental in convening the Madrid peace conference in October 1991 and in persuading all the parties to engage in the subsequent peace negotiations. It was reported widely that the Bush Administration did not share an amicable relationship with the Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir. The Israeli government however, did win the repeal of UN Resolution 3379, which equated Zionism with racism. After the conference, in December 1991, the UN passed United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/86; Israel had made revocation of resolution 3379 a condition of its participation in the Madrid peace conference.[25] After the Labor party won the 1992 election, U.S.-Israel relations appeared to improve. The Labor coalition approved a partial housing construction freeze in the occupied territories on July 19, something the Shamir government had not done despite Bush Administration appeals for a freeze as a condition for the loan guarantees.
Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition on September 10, and signed the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993. President Bill Clinton announced on September 10 that the United States and the PLO would reestablish their dialogue. On October 26, 1994, President Clinton witnessed the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty signing, and President Clinton, Egyptian President Mubarak, and King Hussein of Jordan witnessed the White House signing of the September 28, 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.
President Clinton attended the funeral of assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in Jerusalem in November, 1995. Following a March 1996 visit to Israel, President Clinton offered $100 million in aid for Israel's anti-terror activities, another $200 million for Arrow anti-missile deployment, and about $50 million for an anti-missile laser weapon. President Clinton disagreed with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's policy of expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and it was reported that the President believed that the Prime Minister delayed the peace process. President Clinton hosted negotiations at the Wye River Conference Center in Maryland, ending with the signing of an agreement on October 23, 1998. Israel suspended implementation of the Wye agreement in early December 1998, when the Palestinians violated the Wye Agreement by threatening to declare a state (Palestinian statehood was not mentioned in Wye). In January 1999, the Wye Agreement was delayed until the Israeli elections in May.
Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister on May 17, 1999, and won a vote of confidence for his government on July 6, 1999. President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak appeared to establish close personal relations during four days of meetings between July 15 and 20. President Clinton mediated meetings between Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat at the White House, Oslo, Shepherdstown, Camp David, and Sharm al-Shaykh in the search for peace.
President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Sharon established good relations in their March and June 2001 meetings. On October 4, 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Sharon accused the Bush Administration of appeasing the Palestinians at Israel's expense in a bid for Arab support for the U. S. anti-terror campaign. The White House said the remark was unacceptable. Rather than apologize for the remark, Sharon said the United States failed to understand him. Also, the United States criticized the Israeli practice of assassinating Palestinians believed to be engaged in terrorism, which appeared to some Israelis to be inconsistent with the U.S. policy of pursuing Osama bin Laden "dead or alive."
In 2003, on the heels of the Second Intifada and a sharp economic downturn in Israel, the U.S. provided Israel with $9 billion in conditional loan guarantees made available through 2011 and negotiated each year at the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG).
All recent U.S. administrations have disapproved of Israel's settlement activity as prejudging final status and possibly preventing the emergence of a contiguous Palestinian state. President Bush, however noted the need to take into account changed "realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers," asserting "it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949." He later emphasized that it was a subject for negotiations between the parties.
At times of violence, U.S. officials have urged Israel to withdraw as rapidly as possible from Palestinian areas retaken in security operations. The Bush Administration insisted that United Nations Security Council resolutions be "balanced," by criticizing Palestinian as well as Israeli violence and has vetoed resolutions which do not meet that standard.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not name a Special Middle East Envoy and did not say that she would not get involved in direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations of issues. She said that she preferred to have the Israelis and Palestinians work together, although she traveled to the region several times in 2005. The Administration supported Israel's disengagement from Gaza as a way to return to the Road Map process to achieve a solution based on two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. The evacuation of settlers from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank was completed on August 23, 2005.
On July 14, 2006, the US Congress was notified of a potential sale of $210 million worth of jet fuel to Israel. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency noted that the sale of the JP-8 fuel, should it be completed, will "enable Israel to maintain the operational capability of its aircraft inventory." and "The jet fuel will be consumed while the aircraft is in use to keep peace and security in the region."[26] It was reported in July 24 that the United States was in the process of providing Israel with "bunker buster" bombs, which would allegedly be used to target the leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah guerilla group and destroy its trenches.[27]
American media also questioned whether Israel violated an agreement not to use cluster bombs on civilian targets. Although many of the cluster bombs used were advanced M-85 munitions developed by Israel Military Industries, Israel also used older munitions purchased from the U.S. Evidence during the conflict had shown that cluster bombs had hit civilian areas, although the civilian population had mostly fled, as well as Israel claiming that Hezbollah frequently used civilian areas to stockpile weaponry and fire rockets from in violation of international law. Many bomblets remained undetonated after the war, causing hazard for Lebanese civilians. Israel said that it had not violated any international law because cluster bombs are not illegal and were used only on military targets.[28]
On July 15, the United Nations Security Council again rejected pleas from Lebanon that it call for an immediate ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported the U.S. was the only member of out the 15-nation UN body to oppose any council action at all.[29]
On July 19, the Bush administration rejected calls for an immediate ceasefire.[30] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said certain conditions had to be met, not specifying what they were. John Bolton, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, rejected the call for a ceasefire, on the grounds that such an action addressed the conflict only superficially: "The notion that you just declare a ceasefire and act as if that is going to solve the problem, I think is simplistic."[31]
On July 26, foreign ministers from the United States, Europe and the Middle East that met in Rome vowed "to work immediately to reach with the utmost urgency a ceasefire that puts an end to the current violence and hostilities," though the US maintained strong support for the Israeli campaign and the conference's results were reported to have fallen short of Arab and European leaders' expectations.[32]
Israeli-US relations came under increased strain during Prime Minister Netanyahu's second administration and the new Obama administration. After he took office, Obama made achieving a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians a major goal, and pressured Netanyahu into accepting a Palestinian state and entering negotiations. Netanyahu eventually conceded on July 14, 2009. In accordance with U.S. wishes, Israel imposed a ten-month freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank. As the freeze did not include East Jerusalem, which Israel regards as its sovereign territory, or 3,000 pre-approved housing units already under construction, as well as the failure to dismantle already-built Israeli outposts, the Palestinians rejected the freeze as inadequate, and refused to enter negotiations for nine months.
In 2009, Obama became the first US President to authorize the sale of bunker buster bombs to Israel. The transfer was kept secret to avoid the impression that the United States was arming Israel for an attack on Iran.[33]
In March 2010, Israel announced it would continue to build 1,600 new homes that were already under construction in the eastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo, during Vice-President Joe Biden's visit to Israel. The incident was described as "one of the most serious rows between the two allies in recent decades".[34] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Israel's move was "deeply negative" for US-Israeli relations.[35] East Jerusalem is, on the international diplomatic stage, widely considered to be occupied territory, while Israel disputes this, as it annexed the area.[34] Obama was reported to be "livid" over the announcement.[36]
Shortly afterward, Obama instructed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to present Netanyahu with a four-part ultimatum: that Israel cancel the approval of the housing units, freeze all Jewish construction in East Jerusalem, that Israel make a gesture to the Palestinians that it wants peace with a recommendation on releasing hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, and that Israel agree to discuss a partition of Jerusalem and a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem during the negotiations. Obama threatened that neither he or any senior administration official would meet Netanyahu and his senior ministers during their upcoming visit to Washington.[37]
On March 26, 2010, Netanyahu and Obama met in the White House. The meeting was conducted without photographers or any press statements. During the meeting, Obama demanded that Israel extend the settlement freeze after its expiration, impose a freeze on Jewish construction in East Jerusalem, and withdraw troops to positions held before the start of the Second Intifada. Netanyahu did not give written concessions on these issues, and presented Obama with a flowchart on how permission for building is granted in the Jerusalem Municipality to reiterate that he had no prior knowledge of the plans. Obama then suggested that Netanyahu and his staff stay at the White House to consider his proposals so that if he changed his mind, he could inform Obama right away, and was quoted as saying "I'm still around, let me know if there is anything new". Netanyahu and his aides went to the Roosevelt Room, spent a further half-hour with Obama, and extended his stay for a day of emergency talks to restart peace negotiations, but left without any official statement from either side.[36][38]
On May 19, 2011, Obama made a foreign policy speech in which he called for a return to the pre-1967 Israeli borders with mutually agreed land swaps, to which Netanyahu objected.[39] Obama was also criticized by many on the right in the U.S. for the proposal.[40] The speech came a day before Obama and Netanyahu were scheduled to meet.[41]
In October 2011 the new American Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, suggested that Israeli policies were partly responsible for its increasing diplomatic isolation in the Middle East, but the Israeli government responded that the problem was the growing radicalism in the region rather than their own hard-lined policies.[42]
Since the 1970s, Israel has been one of the top recipients of U.S. foreign aid.[44] While it is mostly military aid, in the past a portion was dedicated to economic assistance, but all economic aid to Israel ended in 2007.
In 2007, the United States increased its military aid to Israel by over 25% to an average of $3 billion per year for the following ten year period. The United States ended economic aid to Israel in 2007, due to Israel's growing economy.[45][46]
In 1998, Israeli, congressional, and Administration officials agreed to reduce U.S. $1.2 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to zero over ten years, while increasing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) from $1.8 billion to $2.4 billion. Separate from the scheduled cuts, there was an extra $200 million in anti-terror assistance, $1.2 billion to implement the Wye agreement, and the supplemental appropriations bill assisted for another $1 billion in FMF for the 2003 fiscal year. For the 2005 fiscal year, Israel received $2.202 billion in FMF, $357 million in ESF, and migration settlement assistance of $50 million. For 2006, the Administration has requested $240 million in ESF and $2.28 billion in FMF. H.R. 3057, passed in the House on June 28, 2005, and in the Senate on July 20, approved these amounts. House and Senate measures also supported $40 million for the settlement of immigrants from the former Soviet Union and plan to bring the remaining Ethiopian Jews to Israel.
Israeli press reported that Israel requested $2.25 billion in special aid in a mix of grants and loan guarantees over four years, with one-third to be used to relocate military bases from the Gaza Strip to Israel in the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and the rest to develop the Negev and Galilee regions of Israel and for other purposes, but none to help compensate settlers or for other civilian aspects of the disengagement. An Israeli team has visited Washington to present elements of the request, and preliminary discussions are underway. No formal request has been presented to Congress. In light of the costs inflicted on the United States by Hurricane Katrina, an Israeli delegation intending to discuss the aid canceled a trip to Washington.
Congress has legislated other special provisions regarding aid to Israel. Since the 1980s, ESF and FMF have been provided as all grant cash transfers, not designated for particular projects, transferred as a lump sum in the first month of the fiscal year, instead of in periodic increments. Israel is allowed to spend about one-quarter of the military aid for the procurement in Israel of defense articles and services, including research and development, rather than in the United States. Finally, to help Israel out of its economic slump, the U.S. provided $9 billion in loan guarantees over three years, use of which was extended to 2008.
President Obama's Fiscal Year 2010 budget proposes $53.8 billion for appropriated international affairs' programs. From that budget, $5.7 billion is appropriated for foreign military financing, military education, and peacekeeping operations. From that $5.7 billion, $2.8 billion, almost 50% is appropriated for Israel.[47] Israel also has available roughly $3 billion of conditional loan guarantees, with additional funds coming available if Israel meets conditions negotiated at the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG).
In 2010, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees approved President Obama's request for $3 billion in military aid to Israel in the 2011 budget.[48] The appropriation has not yet been approved by Congress.
Throughout 2009, however, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, a Republican think tank, reported that Obama has imposed a virtual arms embargo on Israel. Obama blocked all major Israeli weapons requests, including key projects and upgrades, linking arms sales to progress in the peace process. At the same time, Obama approved $10 billion in arms sales to Arab states, including fighters, missiles, helicopters, and fast attack craft. Israel did not protest, despite reports that its qualitative military edge was being eroded.[49]
But Eli Lake, the national security correspondent of The Washington Times, reported on 23 September 2011 that Obama had authorized at the beginning of his presidency "significant new aid to the Israeli military that includes the sale of 55 deep-penetrating bombs known as bunker busters".[50]
Former head of the Israeli Air Force, retired Major General Eitan Ben Eliyahu, has called the American sale of Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II nuclear capable stealth fighter bombers to Israel a key test of the relationship.[51]
Syria has repeatedly requested that Israel re-commence peace negotiations with the Syrian government.[52] There is an on-going internal debate within the Israeli government regarding the seriousness of this Syrian invitation for negotiations. Some Israeli officials asserted that there had been some unpublicized talks with Syria not officially sanctioned by the Israeli government.[53][54][55]
The United States demanded that Israel desist from even exploratory contacts with Syria to test whether Damascus is serious in its declared intentions to hold peace talks with Israel. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was forceful in expressing Washington's view on the matter to Israeli officials that even exploratory negotiations with Syria must not be attempted. For years, Israel obeyed Washington's demand to desist from officially returning to peace talks.[56][57] Around May 2008 however, Israel informed the U.S. that it was starting peace talks with Syria brokered by Turkey. However, Syria withdrew from the peace talks several months later in response to the Gaza War.
The United States has taken on the preeminent role in facilitating peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The US has been criticized as acting as the attorney of the Israeli government rather than as an honest broker, catering and coordinating with the Israeli government at the expense of advancing the peace talks.[58] For example, under the US-Israeli "no surprises" policy, the US government must first check with the Israeli government any ideas for advancing the negotiations before publicly proposing them, which allegedly may have stripped the US of the "independence and flexibility required for serious peacemaking."[58]
Over the years, the United States and Israel have regularly discussed Israel's sale of sensitive security equipment and technology to various countries, especially the People's Republic of China. U.S. administrations believe that such sales are potentially harmful to the security of U.S. forces in Asia. China has looked to Israel to obtain technology it could not acquire from elsewhere, and has purchased a wide array of military equipment and technology, including communications satellites. To further foster its relationship with China, Israel has strongly limited its cooperation with Taiwan. In 2000, the United States persuaded Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon, an advanced, airborne early-warning system developed by Israel Aircraft Industries, to China. In 2005, the U.S. Department of Defense was angered by Israel's agreement to upgrade Harpy Killer unmanned aerial vehicles, which it had sold to China in 1999, and which China tested over the Taiwan Strait in 2004. The Department suspended technological cooperation with the Israeli Air Force on the future F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft as well as several other cooperative programs, held up shipments of some military equipment, and refused to communicate with Israeli Defense Ministry Director, General Amos Yaron, whom Pentagon officials believe misled them about the Harpy deal. According to a reputable Israeli military journalist the U.S. Department of Defense demanded details of 60 Israeli deals with China, an examination of Israel's security equipment supervision system, and a memorandum of understanding about arms sales to prevent future difficulties.
On October 21, 2005, it was reported that pressure from Washington forced Israel to freeze a major contract with Venezuela to upgrade its 22 U.S.-manufactured F-16 fighter jets. The Israeli government had requested U.S. permission to proceed with the deal, but permission was not granted.[59]
After capturing East Jerusalem in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel annexed it and incorporated it into the Jerusalem Municipality, and has built Jewish neighborhoods and Jewish homes in Arab neighborhoods there, along with government offices. Israel has insisted that Jerusalem is its eternal and indivisible capital. The United States does not agree with this position and believes the permanent status of Jerusalem is still subject to negotiations. This is based on the UN's 1947 Partition plan for Palestine, which called for separate international administration of Jerusalem. This position was accepted at the time by most other countries and the Zionist leadership, but rejected by the Arab countries. As a result, most countries had located their embassies in Tel Aviv before 1967; Jerusalem was also located on the contested border. The Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993 similarly state that it is a subject for permanent status negotiations. U.S. Administrations have consistently indicated, by keeping the Embassy of the United States in Israel in Tel Aviv, that Jerusalem's status is unresolved.
In 1995, however, both houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act to move the embassy to Jerusalem, no later than May 31, 1999, and suggested funding penalties on the State Department for non-compliance. Executive branch opposition to such a move, on constitutional questions of Congressional interference in foreign policy, as well as a series of presidential waivers, based on national security interests, have delayed the move by all successive administrations, since it was passed during the Clinton Administration.[60]
The U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem was first established in 1844, just inside the Jaffa Gate. A permanent consular office was established in 1856 in this same building. The mission moved to Street of the Prophets in the late 19th century, and to its present location on Agron Street in 1912. The Consulate General on Nablus Road in East Jerusalem was built in 1868 by the Vester family, the owners of the American Colony Hotel. In 2006, the U.S. Consulate General on Agron Road leased an adjacent building, a Lazarist monastery built in the 1860s, to provide more office space.[61]
In March 2010 Gen. David Petraeus was quoted by Max Boot claiming the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process has "fomented anti-Americanism, undermined moderate Arab regimes, limited the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships, increased the influence of Iran, projected an image of U.S. weakness, and served as a potent recruiting tool for Al Qaeda."[62] When questioned by journalist Philip Klein, Petraeus said Boot "picked apart" and "spun" his speech. He believes there are many important factors standing in the way of peace, including “a whole bunch of extremist organizations, some of which by the way deny Israel’s right to exist. There’s a country that has a nuclear program who denies that the Holocaust took place. So again we have all these factors in there. This [Israel] is just one."[63]
US-Israeli relations came under strain in March 2010, as Israel announced it was building 1,600 new homes in the eastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo as Vice President Joe Biden was visiting.[64] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the move as "insulting".[64] Israel apologized for the timing of the announcement.
Poll results fluctuate every year, although both sides of sympathy have modestly stepped up since 1998 and those with no preference have modestly decreased. The greatest percentage consistently sympathize with Israel. The September 11, 2001 attacks and 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War both saw heights in American sympathy for Israel, with most Americans putting the blame on Hezbollah for the war and the civilian casualties. The record-breaking height of sympathy for Israel was during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as the all-time low of sympathy for the Palestinians, whose leadership supported Saddam Hussein.[65]
As of July 2006, polls claimed that 44% of Americans thought that the "United States supports Israel about the right amount," 11% thought "too little", and 38% thought "too much".[66][67][68][69] Many in the United States question the levels of aid and general commitment to Israel, and argue that a U.S. bias operates at the expense of improved relations with various Arab states. Others maintain that democratic Israel is a helpful and strategic ally, and believe that U.S. relations with Israel strengthen the U.S. presence in the Middle East.[70] A 2002–2006 Gallup Poll of Americans by party affiliation (Republican/Democratic) and ideology (conservative/moderate/liberal) found that although sympathy for Israel is strongest amongst the right (conservative Republicans), the group most on the left (liberal Democrats) also have a greater percentage sympathizing with Israel. Although proportions are different, each group has most sympathizing more with Israel, followed by both/neither, and lastly more with the Palestinians.[71] A 2007 Gallup World Affairs poll included the annual update on Americans' ratings of various countries around the world, and asked Americans to rate the overall importance to the United States of what happens in most of these nations, according to that poll, Israel was the only country that a majority of Americans felt both favorably toward (63%) and said that what happens there is vitally important to the United States (55%).[72]
Israeli attitudes toward the U.S. are largely positive. In several ways of measuring a country's view of America (American ideas about democracy; ways of doing business; music, movies and television; science and technology; spread of U.S. ideas), Israel came on top as the developed country who viewed it most positively.[73]
Israel is in large part a nation of Jewish immigrants. Israel has welcomed newcomers inspired by Zionism, the Jewish national movement. Zionism is an expression of the desire of many Jews to live in a historical homeland. The largest numbers of immigrants have come to Israel from countries in the Middle East and Europe.
The United States has played a special role in assisting Israel with the complex task of absorbing and assimilating masses of immigrants in short periods of time. Soon after Israel's establishment, President Truman offered $135 million in loans to help Israel cope with the arrival of thousands of refugees from the Holocaust. Within the first three years of Israel's establishment, the number of immigrants more than doubled the Jewish population of the country.
Mass immigrations have continued throughout Israeli history. Since 1989, Israel absorbed approximately one million Jews from the former Soviet Union. The United States worked with Israel to bring Jews from Arab countries, Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union to Israel, and has assisted in their absorption into Israeli society. In addition, large numbers of Jewish immigrants arrive from the United States each year, while some Israelis who leave the country have also settled in the United States.
Several regional America-Israel Chambers of Commerce exist to facilitate expansion by Israeli and American companies into each other's markets.[74] American companies such as Motorola, IBM, Microsoft and Intel chose Israel to establish major R&D centers. Israel has more companies listed on the NASDAQ than any country outside North America.
The U.S. and Israel are engaged in extensive strategic, political and military cooperation. This cooperation is broad and includes American aid, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises. American military aid to Israel comes in different forms, including grants, special project allocations and loans.
To address threats to security in the Middle East, including joint military exercises and readiness activities, cooperation in defense trade and access to maintenance facilities. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding marked the beginning of close security cooperation and coordination between the American and Israeli governments. Comprehensive cooperation between Israel and the United States on security issues became official in 1981 when Israel's Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and American Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger signed a Memorandum of Understanding that recognized "the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations." The memorandum called for several measures.
One facet of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship is the joint development of the Arrow Anti-Ballistic Missile Program. Designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles, the Arrow is the most advanced missile defense system in the world. The development is funded by both Israel and the United States. The Arrow has also provided the U.S. the research and experience necessary to develop additional weapons systems.
In April 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Shimon Peres signed the U.S.-Israel Counter-terrorism Accord. The two countries agreed to further cooperation in information sharing, training, investigations, research and development and policymaking.
At the federal, state and local levels there is close Israeli-American cooperation on Homeland Security. Israel was one of the first countries to cooperate with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in developing initiatives to enhance homeland security. In this framework, there are many areas of partnership, including preparedness and protection of travel and trade. American and Israeli law enforcement officers and Homeland Security officials regularly meet in both countries to study counter-terrorism techniques and new ideas regarding intelligence gathering and threat prevention.
In December 2005, the United States and Israel signed an agreement to begin a joint effort to detect the smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material by installing special equipment in Haifa, Israel's busiest seaport. This effort is part of a nonproliferation program of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration that works with foreign partners to detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.
The United States maintains six war reserve stocks inside Israel, and maintains some $300 million in military equipment at these sites. The equipment is owned by the United States and is for use by American forces in the Middle East, but can also be transferred to Israeli use during a time of crisis. The United States is also alleged to keep fighter and bomber aircraft at these sites, and one of the bases is thought to contain a 500-bed hospital for US Marines and Special Forces.[75][76]
The Dimona Radar Facility is an American radar facility in the Negev desert of Israel, located near Dimona. The facility has two 400-foot radar towers designed to track ballistic missiles through space and provide ground-based missiles with the targeting data needed to intercept them. It can detect missiles up to 1,500 miles away. The facility is owned and operated by the US military, and provides only second-hand intelligence to Israel. The towers of the facility are the tallest radar towers in the world, and the tallest towers in Israel.
Although there is strong intelligence cooperation and sharing between the two countries, both have engaged in covert espionage operations against the other.
According to intelligence writer Matthew M. Aid, the United States spied on the Jewish community in British Mandatory Palestine before the State of Israel was formally declared in 1948. Aid also claimed that Israeli intercepts "have always been one of the most sensitive categories", and designated with the code-word "Gamma" to protect their status.[77]
US intelligence began spying on Israel's secret nuclear weapons program at the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona in 1958, when the facility was overflown by American U-2 spy-planes. It was identified as a nuclear site two years later.[78] According to a government-sponsored book on Israeli intelligence, U.S. intelligence has since routinely spied on Israel's non-conventional capabilities, and on "what goes on behind its decision-making echelons" through the use of electronic eavesdropping and trained staff at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv.[79]
Information declassified in 2004 revealed that the United States ran a senior Israeli government official, likely a cabinet minister, as a spy around the time of the 1967 Six-Day War. The spy passed a steady stream of information to the United States through the U.S. military attaché. The information included military and government documents, as well as detailed information on Israeli activity during the Six-Day War.[80]
In 1968, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) allegedly found out about Israel's planned raid on the PLO base in the Jordanian town of Karameh in response to PLO guerilla attacks against Israel. In his memoirs, PLO Deputy Chief Abu Iyad claimed that the he and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat were tipped off about the impending attack by Jordanian officers who learned about it from the CIA.[81]
The CIA continued spying on Israel's military capabilties throughout the 1970s, including the interception of communications and satellite surveillance. The CIA supplied Egypt with Israeli military secrets as part of a covert intelligence liasion. Israel was aware of the agreement, but Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered officials not to raise the matter, as he considered the United States Israel's only real ally. Starting in 1979, the CIA supplied intelligence on Israel to Saudi Arabia, and helped the Saudis interpret and analyze the intelligence. Information about Israel's weak points was shared with other Arab states.[82]
According to Jonathan Pollard, among the information he passed to his Israeli handlers was evidence that the United States had at least 200 agents within the Israeli intelligence, defense, and political ranks passing on classified information to the U.S.[83] Numerous U.S. spies have allegedly been caught in Israel. According to former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israel caught a U.S. spy every few years. Some captured U.S. spies were caught stealing information damaging to Israel's national security. According to Rabin, Israel kept the scandals quiet and generally deported the spies.[84] Former senior Mossad official Yossi Alpher claimed that the CIA does spy on Israel, but that when American spies are caught, they receive "a wrap on the knuckles", and are then deported and declared persona non grata.
In 1986, Yosef Amit, an Israeli military intelligence officer, was charged with spying for the United States. Amit had sold CIA officials classified documents detailing Israeli troop movements and future plans in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, and also sold top-secret documents from the Israeli internal security service Shin Bet. He was arrested after being reported by a friend. A search of his home uncovered numerous classified documents. Amit was tried and found guilty in 1987, and imprisoned until 1993.
Andrjez Kielczynski, a Polish immigrant to Israel who served on the Likud Central Committee and its Security Committee, claimed that he was recruited by the CIA to spy on Israel in 1985. Between then and 1991, Kielczynski allegedly provided a large amount of information on Israel to the United States, and claimed that U.S. intelligence was especially interested in information on Israeli settlement construction, Israel's nuclear program, and discussions in the government and the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset. Some of the other information included a State Comptroller report on the Mossad and Shin Bet, and the positions Israel would take in secret talks with the United States. Kielczynski's activities were discovered, and he fled Israel in 1992 after discovering that he was under suspicion. Kielczynski first fled to Poland, then to the United States, where his requests for political asylum, severance pay, and a stipend were denied, and he was deported to Israel, where Shin Bet agents interrogated him and warned him not to talk to journalists. However, Shin Bet eventually suspended its investigation of him.[85]
In 1992, the U.S. government began satellite monitoring of Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[86]
In 1996, the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapped the phone lines to Israel's embassy in Washington and broke the Israeli security code, exposing Israel's deepest policy secrets to the United States. The wiretapping was discovered following the widely publicized "Mega Scandal", when a phone call intercepted by the NSA became public. Due to Israel's expertise in computers and electronics and the sophistication of its electronic code system, it was widely believed that the NSA used an Israeli mole to obtain the security code. Every staff member was warned about the possibility of being listened to on ordinary and secure phone lines, sent very few telegrams, and sometimes traveled to Israel to deliver reports orally. In addition, it was suspected that U.S. intelligence tried to spy on Israeli embassies around the world and listen in on conversations between the embassy staff and government. The Israeli security service Shin Bet subsequently instructed all diplomats going abroad to treat every phone conversation as if it were being listened to, and to discuss classified information in sign language.[87]
On November 10, 2004, an American submarine entered Israeli territorial waters eighteen kilometers off the coast of Haifa. The submarine's mission was never revealed. It was thought to have been trying to gather intelligence on the city's naval base and headquarters and other vital infrastructure, and was also suspected of intending to intercept Israeli naval electronic signals and test Israel's response to an intrusion. It also may have been trying to install sensors near Israeli naval headquarters and other vital installations. Minutes after it entered Israeli waters, the submarine was detected and tracked by the Israeli Navy. The submarine was initially identified as belonging to a NATO power, and later confirmed to be American. The Israeli General Staff refrained from ordering an attack on what was considered the asset of a friendly nation. After several hours, the submarine submerged and fled, presumably determining that it was under surveillance. The Israeli Navy then sent fast patrol craft, missile boats, and helicopters in pursuit. The submarine was not found, but military sources maintained that the submarine had failed to complete its mission.[88][89] According to Israeli officials, such spy missions were common, and Western spy submarines had been intercepted by Israel before. Following the incident, reports surfaced that United States had increased intelligence operations against Israel as part of an effort to prevent an Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip in response to rocket fire, or offensive action against Hezbollah or Syria. The reports also claimed that the U.S. had increased satellite monitoring of Israel to determine military movements, import and export of weapons, weapon tests and settlement construction, and that the U.S. had also expanded the interception of signals communications from Israeli government and military facilities.[90]
According to Israeli journalist Yossi Melman and American journalist Dan Raviv, Israeli intelligence operatives and journalists have suspected that the United States embassy in Tel Aviv has sophisticated surveillance systems tasked with monitoring Israel, especially since it has been noticed that some antennas and equipment on the embassy building's roof are covered. The Mossad, other Israeli security agencies, and top politicians suspect that U.S. intelligence routinely listens in to their phone conversations, copies fax messages, and intercepts their email messages. The U.S. embassy is also suspected of intercepting and analyzing data transmitted on various wavelengths by Israeli military units, aviation manufacturers, space launch sites, and facilities suspected of doing nuclear work. As well as through the embassy, the U.S. is also suspected of spying on Israel via satellites and spy ships in the Mediterranean. One request by U.S. embassy officials to rent office space in a Tel Aviv beach hotel room was denied by Israeli authorities, as the location was close to the headquarters of the Mossad and Unit 8200, the Israeli military's codebreaking and high-tech surveillance unit. The U.S. embassy's CIA station is also alleged to gather information from newspapers, web articles, radio and television broadcasts, and conversations with Israeli citizens, then analyzes the results.[91]
According to a classified U.S. State Department cable from October 31, 2008, released during the United States diplomatic cables leak, the U.S. embassies in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, as well as the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency, were directed by the Bush administration to conduct espionage operations against Israel, targeting all aspects of Israel's political system, society, communications infrastructure, and military. Diplomats and spies were asked to gather intelligence on planned Israeli military operations in the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Lebanon. American agents probed the attitudes of Israeli military commanders and gathered information on Israel's military units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale, operational readiness, tactics, techniques and procedures for conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist operations, and Israeli assessment on the impact of reserve duty in the occupied territories on its military readiness. Information was also sought on government plans, potential ways Israeli politicians could be influenced, how politicians decide to launch military strikes, the attitude of politicians towards the U.S, the official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of military and civilian leaders, Israeli military, intelligence, and civilian communications infrastructure, and coded means of producing passports and government ID badges. In addition, U.S. intelligence operations also targeted Israeli settlements in the West Bank and communities in the Golan Heights, seeking information on divisions among various settlement groups, settlement-related budgets and subsidies, and settlers' relationships with the political and military establishment, including information on their lobbying and settlement methods.[92]
In 2011, it was revealed that the FBI had wiretapped the Israeli embassy in Washington, after Shamai Leibowitz, an Israeli-American working as a Hebrew translator for the FBI, was sentenced to 20 months in prison for leaking recorded wiretaps of the Israeli embassy to the media.[93][94]
In October 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama reportedly ordered increased intelligence monitoring of Israel to obtain clues on its intentions regarding the Iranian nuclear program after he failed to obtain an assurance from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak that the U.S. government would be informed prior to any Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities.[95]
In the 1950s, Israeli intelligence bugged the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. In 1954, security officials at the U.S. embassy microphones concealed in the ambassador's office. In 1956, bugs were found attached to two telephones in the home of a U.S. military attatche. Shin Bet, Israel's internal security service, also offered cash bribes and used female operatives to seduce U.S. Marines guarding the U.S. embassy in an attempt to collect intelligence.[91]
Israeli intelligence penetrated the United States military-industrial complex in the 1960s and engaged in industrial espionage to boost Israel's domestic defense industries, relying on military officers and the Defense Ministry scientific and technological unit Lekem. US intelligence also suspected that Israel built its first nuclear bombs with highly enriched uranium that its agents covertly took from a United States Navy nuclear fuel plant operated by the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation. Between the 1960s and mid-1980s, several Israeli espionage operations were uncovered by U.S. law enforcement.[91] In the most notable such case, Jonathan Pollard, a Jewish employee of U.S. naval intelligence, was recruited by Lekem to sell secrets to Israel. Pollard sold Lekem tens of thousands of classified documents, beginning in June 1984. His removal of documents was reported by a co-worker, leading to his arrest and conviction. Four Israeli officials also were indicted, but all remained in Israel to avoid possible arrest. Pollard was sentenced to life in prison and his wife to two consecutive five-year terms for having assisted him. He was granted Israeli citizenship in 1996, and Israeli officials periodically raise the Pollard case with U.S. counterparts.
U.S. Jewish national Ben-ami Kadish, a former U.S. Army mechanical engineer, gave national defense-related documents to Israeli intelligence from 1979 to 1985. He was arrested and tried in 2008. In December 2008, he pleaded guilty to being an "unregistered agent for Israel",[96] and admitted to disclosing classified U.S. documents to Israel in the 1980s.[97][98] In determining the sentence, Judge William H. Pauley III asserted, "Why it took the government 23 years to charge Mr. Kadish is shrouded in mystery."[99] Pauley stated that prison would "serve no purpose" for a man of Kadish's advanced age and infirmity, opting to levy a $50,000 fine against Kadish.[99]
Following the Pollard affair, Israeli intelligence continued industrial espionage operations in the United States, despite instructions from the political leadership not to spy on the United States. The U.S. intelligence community was aware that Israel continued its espionage operations. In the late 1990s, FBI assistant director for counterintelligence David Szady, dismayed at the level of Israeli espionage, reportedly called the head of the Mossad station at the Israeli embassy and told him to "knock it off".[100]
According to a 1996 Defense Department security memo, Israeli intelligence was "aggressively" collecting information on U.S. military and industrial technology, including spy satellite data, missile defense information, and data on aircraft, tanks, missile boats, and radars. Drawing on the example of the Pollard case and four other Israeli espionage operations in the United States, the memo said that Israel's techniques to recruit spies in the U.S. included "ethnic targeting, financial aggrandizement, and identification and exploitation of individual frailities", and stated that "placing Israeli nationals in key industries" was a highly successful technique. The memo alleged that Israeli agents stole "proprietary information" from an Illinois optics firm in 1986, and test equipment for a radar system in the mid-1980s.[101] In 1998, the FBI claimed that Israel was a major player in industrial espionage against the United States, along with France, Germany, South Korea, Russia, and China.[102]
Lawrence Franklin, a former U.S. Air Force reserve colonel, was arrested for passing classified information regarding U.S. policy towards Iran to Israeli intelligence with the alleged help of AIPAC members Steve J. Rosen and Keith Weissman. Franklin pleaded guilty in 2005, while Rosen and Weissman were initially indicted but had their case dismissed. The Israeli embassy denied the charges.
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